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This article pursues two objectives. First, it provides a literature review of research on group radicalization and,
second, building on previous research about narratives and their influence on radicalization, it introduces a new
concept for comparative radicalization studies: bridging narratives. We use this term to address commonalities in
the ideological elements found across various radicalized groups. As narratives shape perceptions of the world
and guide processes of identification, they assume an important (internal) function in group formation. At the
same time, various radical groups (ethnic nationalists, Salafist-jihadists and militant leftists) share core ideolo-
gical elements, commonalities that can lead to the creation of new coalitions and unexpected alliances (an ex-
ternal function). The common factor among them are constructed conceptions of the adversary – be they mod -
ernity, universalism, Jewish people or feminism. Such constructions allow for the fabrication of an enemy as well
as specific conceptions of hierarchical social orders. We analyze two examples in this context: anti-feminism (in-
cluding heroic or toxic masculinity) and the resistance dispositif  that promotes vigilante terrorism. This ap-
proach allows us to investigate processes of group radicalization while also taking into account their ideological
content as well as the formal effects of such content on processes of group-building and the dynamics of radical-
ization. In the final section, we provide recommendations for action.
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Radicalization processes are – among other causes –
an expression of unresolved social conflict. They force
us  to  address  the  question  of  just  how  strong  (or
weak) social cohesion really is and why individuals or
groups come to assume a confrontational stance, es-
pecially for cases in which they legitimize or use vio-
lence. Within groups, in particular, processes of inter-
action  and  socialization  can  develop  a  dynamic
through which the members of a given group become
ever-more alienated from society.
Three  core  questions  guide  our  analysis  of  this
process.  First,  which  mechanisms  and  development
conditions  that  are  conducive  to  radicalization  pro-
cesses occur  within groups (social  bonding)? Second,
which  processes  have  an  effect  between different
groups  (social  bridging)?  Third,  what  is  the  role  of
group radicalization in relation to society, e.g., in rela-
tion  to  discourses  about  society  as  a  whole  (social
linking).1 Although narratives  play a role  in  each of
1 For the distinction between social bonding, bridging and 
linking, we draw on a recent study about Community re-
IJCV: Vol. 14(2)/2020
Meiering, Dziri, Foroutan: Connecting Structures 2
these areas, we focus primarily on the bridging func-
tion  of  narratives  between  ideologically  divergent
groups.
When  group  radicalization  is  conceptualized  as  a
case of violent political extremism, a major distinction
must be drawn between idealistic definitions and be-
havioral  definitions  (Stephens,  Sieckelinck,  and
Boutellier 2019, 2). The first definition focusses on the
ideological  content  adopted  by  the  groups,  which
stands opposed to the pillars of the respective politi-
cal constitution (or to the core values of society, in the
words of Peter Neumann 2013, 874). The second defi-
nition focusses on means and methods, irrespective of
the political aim. The concept of violent political ex-
tremism places greater emphasis on the behavioral as-
pect,  in  that  it  focusses  more  on the  means rather
than on ideological content.  While this  ideal-typical
differentiation  does  not  strictly  correspond to  what
can be found in existing literature – as most authors
describe  a  complex  interplay  between ideology  and
action  (e.g.  Corman  2011;  Berger  2017) –  there  are
some branches of literature that primarily address the
interaction dynamics prevalent in the processes and
mechanisms of group formation, which are assumed
to  be  similar  across  various  political  and  religious
groups  (e.g.  Malthaner,  Bosi  and  Demetriou  2014,
della  Porta 2013).  Our intention here is  to  build on
these findings by taking into account shared ideologi-
cal content as well as its formal effects on processes of
group-building  and  the  dynamics  of  radicalization.
Additionally, as this article evolved from the project
“Society  Extreme”,  which  synthetized  research  on
(de-)radicalization in Germany and beyond,  another
aim is to bridge the gap between the German research
field/network and the broader international academic
debate/network.  Unlike  the  international  debate
about radicalization, the discussion in Germany – es-
pecially  in  the rather  conservative  parts  in  Political
Science, the security services and large parts of fed-
eral prevention programs – is dominated by a specific
definition of extremism that is premised on the idea
of the “liberal democratic basic order” as a core sub-
stance of the German constitution. This so-called “ex-
tremism theory” imagines the existence of a non-radi-
cal center that is being contested by two ends of the
silience to violent extremism (Ellis and Abdi 2017).
political  spectrum.  Based  on  this  conception,  these
two poles, the Left and the Right, tend to be closer to
one other than they are to the political center itself
and are therefore quite identical,  merely differing in
their  ideology  of  equality  or  inequality  (e.g.
Schroeder/Deutz-Schroeder  2015).  Leaving  aside  the
exculpation of the center that has historically proven
to be the origin of fascism (extremism of the center, see
Lipset  1959),  German research on comparative radi-
calization has run the risk of equating two quite dif-
ferent phenomena. By combining German and inter-
national  radicalization  research  with  our  proposed
concept of bridging narratives, we attempt to conduct
comparative research without reproducing the short-
comings  that  characterize  the  dominant  German
branch of research on the topic.
The  core  ideological  elements  (so-called  ideolo-
gemes, discursive elements or narratives) adopted by
various  radical  groups  often  follow  similar  patterns
and exhibit  overlaps, leading to the creation of new
coalitions and unexpected alliances. The common de-
nominator among them are constructed conceptions
of the adversary – be they modernity,  universalism,
Jewish people or feminism. These constructions allow
for the fabrication of an enemy and the creation of
specific conceptions of hierarchical social orders. Such
narratives claim sovereignty over an understanding of
how society should work, which forms of community
life are legitimate and which must be opposed by rad-
ical means – not least in relation to the proper family
and the  proper interpretation of gender roles. It is in
this context that we introduce the concept of bridging
narratives – a term we use to address commonalities
among the ideological elements found across various
radicalized groups.
1 A review of the literature: group dynamics 
within radicalization research
This section provides an overview of existing literature
on group radicalization processes. We start by sum-
marizing  the  evolution  of  this  research  field  along
with findings from the areas of group sociology, socio-
psychological studies about group dynamics, and re-
search on social movements. We then investigate the
role assumed by collective patterns of interpretation
in the context of radicalization processes.
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1.1 Processes and mechanisms of radicalization2
First coined in the 1970s (Logvinov 2017, 59), the con-
cept of radicalization has experienced a revival and an
initial shift in focus towards Islamist-inspired radical-
ization processes after the events of September 11th
(Neumann  2013,  873).  In  more  recent  years,  an  in-
creasing number of studies have developed a general
understanding of  radicalization processes  influenced
by the far-right, the far-left or separatists (Dzhekova
et al. 2016, 8). One branch of this research addresses
the matter of whether and to what extent radicaliza-
tion,  when understood as a process,  will  necessarily
be  accompanied  by  the  use  of  physical  violence  at
some subsequent phase (see Bartlett and Miller 2012;
Kundnani  2012). Dalgaard-Nielsen  (2010)  distin-
guishes  among  three  currents  within  empirical  re-
search on violent radicalization in Europe: French so-
ciological  approaches  (such  as  Gilles  Kepel,  Farhad
Khosrokhavar and Olivier  Roy),  the theory of  social
movements  and  networks,  and  empiricist  or  case-
study-driven approaches. Additional research currents
have formed in response to matters of definition, con-
cept and contextualization (see Schmid 2013, 8), to de-
bates about whether people and groups radicalize on
their own or are radicalized by others (see Murshed
Pavan, and Sirseloudi 2010),  and to the connections
between religion and radicalization in the context of
recruitment strategies (see Abou-Taam et al. 2016). In
addition to the matter of “how”, past research has also
addressed the question of “where”: the latter has pri-
marily  focused  on  correctional  facilities  (Neumann
2016), educational institutions (Gambetta and Hertog
2016) and concepts of  on- and offline activism (von
Behr et al. 2013).
When  considering  the  individual  career  paths  of
radicalization, the sheer diversity of underlying moti-
vations  as  well  as  biographical  and external  drivers
leads us to the conclusion that addressing the meso-
sociological  mechanisms  of  radicalization  is  indeed
more effective.3 This is the level at which the collective
2 In a previous publication, we described the development of
extremism research and our reasons to completely forgo 
this concept. Instead, we only speak of radicalization pro-
cesses (see Meiering et al. 2018; Teune 2018). 
3 For the recent shift  from the lone actor paradigm towards 
meso-sociological approaches, see Hofmann 2018; Schuur-
man et al. 2018; Jackson 2018.
identities that structure options for interpretation and
action are channeled together and gain the potential
for radicalization – position taken by critical terrorism
research, with Donatella della Porta as its most well-
known  proponent  (see  della  Porta  2013).  Moreover,
the rationality behind terrorist actions is not extrapo-
lated from the micro-level  but,  rather,  becomes evi-
dent  in  the  context  of  (political)  group  objectives
(Hegemann and Kahl 2018, 78–79; see Neumann 2016,
34).
Besides  models  describing  processes  of  individual
radicalization (Ayanian et al. 2018; for a critical view,
see  Sedgwick  2010,  Schmid  2013,  5),  a  number  of
process models have been proposed that adopt socio-
psychological  research  findings  by  analyzing  group
processes (following Tuckman and Jensen 1977). These
models  presuppose  the  existence  of  formal  mecha-
nisms with an effect on all group-building processes,
regardless of their ideological orientation.
In  Germany,  some  of  the  more  well-known  case
studies  have  investigated  groups  such  as  the  NSU
(National  Socialist  Underground,  see  Quent  2016a;
Koehler 2017) or the RAF (Red Army Faction, see Aust
2009). A study by Kiefer et al. (2017) provides insights
into the radicalization process of a German Islamist
network through an investigation of their communi-
cations via a WhatsApp chat group. Outside of Ger-
many,  researchers  have  done  case  studies  about
groups  such  as  The  Weather  Underground  (Varon
2004) and the English Defense League (Copsey 2010;
Bartlett and Littler 2011; Busher 2018). In the United
States, two broad umbrella movements can be identi-
fied:  the  anti-government  extremist  movement  and
the  white  supremacist  movement  (Anti-Defamation
League 2018). As Taylor points out, it is not necessary
for  a  perpetrator  to  be  an  actual  member  of  these
groups; instead, white supremacists are ideologically
radicalized  in  an  “overlapping  web  of  movements”
comprised  of  multiple  groups  such  as  the  Ku  Klux
Klan (KKK),4 neo-Nazi groups such as Atomwaffen Di-
vision, and skinhead groups such as the Hammerskin
Nation  (Perliger  2012;  Simi,  Windisch,  and  Sporer
2016, as cited in Taylor 2019, 227). Increasingly, what
were  once  largely  interpreted  as  single  perpetrator
4 For more about the less well-known second coming of the 
KKK, vigilantism and the long tradition of White Supremacy
in the United States of America, see Gordon 2017.
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attacks in the context of right-wing political violence
are now conceptualized as international, interrelated
phenomena. The perpetrator of the Christchurch at-
tack that killed 51 Muslims, for example, claimed to
been  motivated  by  white  terrorist  attacks  in  the
United  States  (Charleston),  Norway  (Oslo/Utøya),
Canada  (Quebec  City  Mosque  Shooting),  Sweden
(Trollhättan  school  attack)  and  others.  In  turn,  the
2019 El Paso shooter with anti-Latino-American senti-
ments, who killed 22 people, claimed to have been in-
spired by the Christchurch attack. Meso-sociological
perspectives should, as such, not only include group
case studies but also investigate ostensibly single at-
tacks  as  parts  of  national  and  international  move-
ments  and  networks,  especially  online  (see  Black-
bourn, McGarrity, and Roach 2019; Campion 2019).
Besides internal dynamics, other studies have also
compared  external  interaction  dynamics.  The  con-
tentious-politics  approach proposed by Tarrow,  Tilly
and McAdam (see McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001; Tilly
and Tarrow 2007; Tarrow 2016) considers various theo-
retical investigations from hitherto separate lines of
research,  unifying  them  within  the  field  of  social
movement studies (della Porta and LaFree 2012; Bosi,
Demetriou,  and Malthaner  2014  in  connection  with
political violence). Sageman (e.g. 2004) and Wiktorow-
icz (2003; 2005) – followed by Bakker (2006) and Neu-
mann and Rogers (2008) – also consider radicalization,
first and foremost, as the outcome of social interac-
tions. The work of della Porta (2013), in particular, as-
sumes a central position in the field of comparative
research on group radicalization processes. According
to her findings, escalation mechanisms within interac-
tions entail the key elements of radicalization, taking
place among state actors as well as within the respec-
tive movements (della Porta 1995). Finally, Malthaner
and Waldmann (2014) have investigated the connec-
tion between terrorist groups and their supporting mi-
lieus.
These branches of research have identified numer-
ous mechanisms that contribute to processes of radi-
calization.  The results  have  proven  eclectic,  encom-
passing not only meso- but also micro-level  mecha-
nisms. In the area of group radicalization, McCauley
and Moskalenko (2011) offer us a wide range of op-
tions. For the purpose of this study, we present the
mechanisms that are relevant for the phenomenon of
group radicalization. As Winter et al. (2020) have al-
ready  addressed  the  role  of  online  communication
within radicalization processes in depth, we have left
this aspect aside.
Research on social movements and political violence
emphasizes the significance of interpersonal processes
and contacts (as opposed to explanations of psycho-
logical or social “pathologies”).  Personal relationships
(friendship, family relations and love) enable access to
the  respective  social  groups.  Whether  left-wing,
ethno-nationalistic  or  religious  movements,  personal
connections also contribute to building trust and loy-
alty beyond the first group phase, ensuring that soli-
darity with the group remains intact, despite arising
pressure or high risks  posed for the individual.  The
mechanism proposed by the  slippery-slope argument
is  related  to  this  (McCauley  and Moskalenko 2011,
44–45):  even  an  initially  low-level  of  engagement
within a broader social movement can pave the way
for “high-risk activism” (Malthaner 2017, 377), as this
allows for new roles to be tested out and additional
contacts to be established. The predominant percep-
tions, attitudes and values are gradually adopted, con-
tributing to a progressive process of cognitive radical-
ization (Malthaner and Waldmann 2014).  Entry into
the new group (core group) is often connected with
complete personal reorientation and breaking contact
with  one’s  previous  social  circles  (unfreezing).  The
pace of this process can vary greatly, from a sudden
withdrawal  to a gradual  reorientation (for  a  gender
perspective, see Alava, Frau-Meigs, and Hassan 2017,
44; Brown 2013; Sjoberg and Gentry 2011). Offers of
inclusion are often linked to demands for exclusivity,
such as claims of being the true believers. The more
ideologically  rigid  and  homogeneous  the  group  be-
comes through the process of self-affirmation in rela-
tion  to  attitudes,  views  and  options  for  action,  the
more  likely  moderate  members  of  the  group are to
exit,  leaving  behind  a  core  group  that  eventually
comes to accept  violence as  a  means of  action – a
process that della Porta (2013, 146–152) describes as
ideological encapsulation.  In addition to personal, af-
fective connections, we must also consider the envi-
ronmental conditions discussed below that enable and
promote the use of political violence.
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In the Islamist context,  subjective experiences of in-
justice can  be  brought  about  by  discrimination  or
marginalization by  majority  society  or  the  state.  In
the far-right context, such sentiments can result from
the perception that one is being cheated on account
of  society’s  growing concern with facilitating immi-
gration. An experience of injustice may lead the indi-
vidual to develop a desire for revenge, thereby differ-
entiating such experiences from mere perceptions of
deprivation. While personal resentment can prove to
be detrimental to the achievement of the group’s ob-
jectives,  individual  experiences  of  injustice  develop
their  greatest potential  for  radicalization when they
are interpreted “in the context of a group and as part
of  the  greater  political  struggle”  (McCauley  and
Moskalenko 2011, 220). Whether or not the threat de-
rives from a personal experience is irrelevant; for an
individual, it is enough to feel that he/she is part of a
group  (or  movement,  etc.),  consequently  believing
that any attack, experience of injustice or threat – af-
fecting the entire group or just part of it – constitutes
a personal affront (Obaidi et al. 2018). Taylor, Currie
and Holbrook (2013) state that this  not only incites
prejudices but also the potential for violence. Building
on approaches of “fraternal” (as opposed to egoistic)
experiences of deprivation (Runciman 1966), there are
a number of studies that address how certain groups
attempt to create such individual identification with
the group (e.g. Joyce and Lynch 2018 about the self-
victimization of political ex-prisoners in Northern Ire-
land; Macdonald 2011;  Heath-Kelly 2013).  McCauley
(2001, 349) even claims that political attitudes and ac-
tions tend to be more related to group identifications
than  they  are  to  overriding  self-interests.  In  other
words, the effectiveness of experiences of injustice or
feelings of endangerment depend on how processes of
attributed identification are steered and framed (for
more on framing,  see Snow and Byrd 2007).  Narra-
tives  prove  to  be  of  crucial  importance  for  this
process. Through the application of an opposition nar-
rative (see chapter 2.2), for example, perceptions of a
threat come to be related to a specific in-group: an
imagined racial community in the case of the Identi-
tarian right, the principle of al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ (fealty
and disavowal) in the case of Islamists, or the “many
from down here” as opposed to the “few from the top”
(“We are the 99%” from Occupy Wall  Street)  in the
case of the left-wing movement.
Across all areas, empirical research has unanimously
shown that confrontations with state power and forms
of repression, in particular, exhibit a high potential for
mobilization whenever they are deemed to be unjust
or excessive, thereby triggering subjective or fraternal
experiences of injustice (Lindekilde 2014; Quent 2016a,
64; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 425). This type of
confrontation  increases  the  risks  and  the  costs  of
membership  and  leads  moderate  members  of  the
group to  drop out,  leaving  behind a  hardened core
group with the tendency to radicalize more rapidly.
Particularly with regard to left-wing violence – which,
in contrast to right-wing or Islamist violence has been
largely  limited  to  confrontational  violence  towards
the state and political  opponents – the “image of a
disproportionately  violent  and  unfair  state”  (Quent
2016a, 64) serves as justification for violence. This also
applies  to  labeling  young  people  from  the  protest
scene as  sympathizers  or  supports  of  terror  groups:
the current legal proceedings involving the riots dur-
ing  the  G20  Summit  in  Hamburg,  along  with  the
strategy  adopted  by  the  police  forces  (“Hamburg
Front”) and depictions in the media serve as a prime
example of this  (Malthaner, Teune and Ullrich 2018,
2f.,  44). Within a group, state repression can dictate
the boundaries of violent action that is understood to
be legitimate. Moreover, it is quite evident that the re-
pressive strategy of instituting organizational bans are
prone to causing radicalization into violence, attract-
ing solidarity from other groups and boosting public-
ity  (see Minkenberg  2003,  32–33).  The same can be
said of Salafist groups, which present themselves as
an “oppositional”  struggle:  for  them, “every form of
repression  [serves]  as  confirmation  of  belonging  to
the  chosen  elite  and  of  following  the  right  path”
(Abou-Taam et al. 2016, 9).
In recent years, the concept of  co-radicalization has
gained traction, especially in studies of Islamism. This
concept is used to describe interrelated phenomena of
radicalization through which groups interacting with
one another mutually contribute to each other’s radi-
calization. Such processes of radicalization can be fu-
eled or even generated through social dramatization,
banalization  and  misdirected  acts  of  prevention
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(Logvinov 2017, 89). Responses to jihadist attacks, in
particular,  carry  the risk of  inciting resentment and
securitization among society as a whole that can sub-
sequently promote processes of co-radicalization. Nu-
merous studies and analyses have dealt with Islamo-
phobia, the criticism of Islam, anti-Islam attitudes and
anti-Muslim  racism  in  this  sense  (Uenal  2016).  Is-
lamist  and  Salafist  groups,  in  turn,  reinterpret  the
idea of the outsider (Ġurabā) and use it to attract new
members (Köpfer 2014, 446). Douglas Pratt expands on
the concept of co-radicalization by proposing the idea
of interactions among radicalizations (so-called  reac-
tive co-radicalization). Based on this approach, he con-
siders  the  attacks  carried  out  by  Anders  Behring
Breivik  as  a  radical  reaction  developed  as  a  conse-
quence of the presence of Islam in an otherwise secu-
lar environment, which is perceived – and intention-
ally framed – to be a threat (Pratt 2015, 216, see also
Moghaddam  2018).  The  mobilization  of  anti-fascist
groups against right wing groups or populists is an-
other  example  of  reactive  co-radicalization  (see  the
discussion in Doyle (ed.)  2019;  Copsey 2017;  Busher
and  Macklin  2015,  discussing  cumulative  radicaliza-
tion).
Here,  radicalization  is  taken  to  be  a  relational
process of activities pursued by political groups that
unfolds in phases and is accompanied by spirals of es-
calation and cognitive framing. In the next section, we
look into the socializing functions of group cultures
and their influence on processes of radicalization.
1.2 Collective patterns of interpretation: 
socialization, subculture, counterculture and 
pop culture
Another area of investigation within radicalization re-
search concerns collective patterns of interpretation.
While  ideology often appears to be rather insignifi-
cant in the nascent stages of a radicalization process,
it gains ever-greater influence as the process of group
formation advances. Research on youth-specific types
of  social  group  formation  considers  this  condition
through  the  concept  of  group  culture  (della  Porta
2013, 12–13).
Groups  are  considered  to  be  the  most  effective
agents of socialization for adolescents in their strug-
gle for identity (Davydov 2015). They encourage the
separation of young people from their original fami-
lies and provide members with the attention, recogni-
tion and appreciation that society has otherwise de-
nied them. Cliques  serve  a double role:  they create
stable conflict  constellations  based on ideologically-
driven concepts of the enemy (kuffār, the West, for-
eigners,  the  left,  Antifa,  the  police,  the  state)
(Bergmann and Erb 1994) and, at the same time, their
subcultural elements are attractive for young people,
who come to adopt the ideological  elements  of  the
group  during  their  time  as  members  of  the  clique.
Groups  thereby  assume  a  politicizing,  ideologizing
and  normalizing  function.  Internally,  they  set  up  a
new social reality that influences the perceptions and
behavior of  its  members  (for  more on the cognitive
dynamics, see Malthaner 2017, 374). This process be-
comes particularly potent when the group culture is
framed  as  a  “counterculture”,  or  oppositional  (El-
Mafaalani 2018; Davydov 2015, 8). This was not only
the case for the hippie and anti-war movement but is
also adopted as a strategy of the European New Right
today (“Kontrakultur”).
The concept  of  subculture  has  enjoyed a  long  re-
search tradition within sociology and cultural studies
and it is closely connected to the Birmingham School
from the Centre for Contemporary Cultural  Studies
(see Schulman 1993). The latter synthesized interdisci-
plinary approaches such as Marxism, feminism, criti-
cal race theory and ethnographic methods and inves-
tigated the relationship between different cultures (al-
ways in the plural) as power relations within a strug-
gle for cultural hegemony (see Centre for Contempo-
rary Cultural Studies 2012 [1977]). Group cultures are
characterized as subcultures when they significantly
differentiate  themselves  from  majority  culture  –  or
“parent-culture” as Hall and Jefferson (1976, 12f.) state
– through their own binding norms, values and activi-
ties.  Early  studies  looked  into  skinhead  subculture
(Clarke 1976) as well  as nonpolitical  youth cultures,
such as the Mods, and investigated the cultural mean-
ing of drug use (see Hall and Jefferson 1976). Beyond
being  internal  to  the  group,  subcultures  may  also
comprise a heterogeneous and uneven network of dis-
parate groups. According to Bergmann and Erb (1998,
157), one feature that is of tremendous significance is
the “special language code that solidifies core ideolog-
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ical beliefs through key concepts [...] while also sig-
nalizing belonging and exclusion by way of an opposi-
tion scheme”.  For  right-wing mobilization,  this  may
include terms such as  the nation,  culturally  foreign
(kulturfremd),  the  occident  (or  West)  and  the  lying
press; for Islamism, it may include Dār al-Islām (abode
of peace)  versus  Dār al-Harb (abode of  war),  kuffār,
brothers and sisters; and, for left-wing scene, it may
include system, imperialists and fascists. Such subcul-
tural codes serve to create a sense of belonging that
can even consolidate into a collective identity. Accord-
ing  to  della  Porta  and  Diani  (2006,  113),  collective
identities are a precondition for the emergence of col-
lective action. 
Drawing on studies about (sub-)cultures, discourse
analysis and subsequent discursive network analyses
have contributed to our understanding of radicaliza-
tion processes, as well. In recent years, the boundaries
have blurred among various groupings, meaning that
certain terms, symbols and codes are no longer exclu-
sively claimed by a particular subculture but now af-
fect  various  groups  and networks  in  terms  of  their
perceptions and behavioral structures through differ-
ent concrete codings (Wimmer 2008, chapter 3). Con-
currently,  subcultures  hardly  distinguish  themselves
along the lines of the classic socio-structural indica-
tors any longer. For example, the new-right Identitar-
ian grouping not only attracts people from the con-
ventional “far-right extremes” but also from the stu-
dent, middle-class and artistic milieus. Protests orga-
nized by Pegida likewise draw in participants from di-
verse social  milieus, and, with regard to Islamist re-
cruiting, as well,  class backgrounds have limited ex-
planatory  power  (Bundeskriminalamt  2015,  16–17,
Malthaner 2017). Classic subcultural phenomena such
as right-wing rock do, nevertheless, continue to exist
alongside such new alliances (Bundesministerium des
Innern 2017, 157–158).
Subculture also plays a key role within Islamist pro-
cesses  of  radicalization  (Toprak  and  Weitzel  2017).
Abou-Taam et al. (2016, 16) point to pop jihad, which
is  marketed  and  promoted  through  videos,  texts,
anāshīd (Islamic a capella chants, see Pieslak and La-
houd 2018) and other forms of internet content (see
Said 2016; Ahmed and Pisoiu 2017). The ongoing tele-
vision series  Inside of the Caliphate is  illustrative of
the strategy adopted by the Islamic State (ISIS) of im-
parting its viewers with a feeling of being close to the
global struggle and the life of Mujahideen. In relation
to the right, the topic of “pop culture” has been the
subject  of  controversy  with  regard  to  phenomena
such as “right rap” and “nipsters”. Through this, we
can identify the trend of radicalized groups seeking to
increase their appeal to the outside world. The New
Right, for example, is adopting established, disruptive
forms of protest such as climbing buildings, squatting
and  staging  sit-ins  while  also  rhetorically  defusing
ideological  patterns  of  interpretation.  Animosity  to-
wards foreigners is being reformulated as “love for the
homeland”,  racist  nationalism  is  being  renamed
“ethnopluralism” and the  slogan “foreigners  out!”  is
being  rephrased as  “remigration!”  The aim of  these
amendments is to create inroads into the general so-
cial discourse and the middle-class milieu in order to
gradually  attain  “cultural  hegemony”  (Kellershohn
2016). Using this strategy, groups are able to reformu-
late, intensify and spread radical content for radical-
ization processes; in so doing, they assume the role of
a  catalyst.  Particularly  in  relation  to  the  resistance
dispositif and vigilante terrorism (such as committed
by  the  right-wing  group  “Gruppe  Freital”),  such
groups are laying fertile ground that empowers radi-
calized groups and individual perpetrators while also
allowing them to vicariously legitimate their actions. 
1.3 Preliminary conclusion
Beyond  individual  dispositions  and  motivations,  re-
search on group dynamics can elucidate how radical-
ization is able to become increasingly energized once
access to the respective groups, networks and move-
ments has been established. Groups close themselves
off to the outside and become inwardly homogeneous;
they increase the likelihood of violent action by turn-
ing to personal connections, by influencing attitudes,
perceptions and structures of action, and by relying
on relational processes outside of the group through
engagement with other groups or state actors. While
a  branch  research  on  such  movements  has  investi-
gated the dynamics of interaction through confronta-
tion and repression, we refer to another approach that
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focuses on how perceptions are structured.5 Framing
processes assume a key role for steering subjective ex-
periences of injustice, intensifying feelings of belong-
ing, concretizing conceptions of the enemy and shap-
ing  the  discursive  formulation  of  external  political
events – process forms that are often structured ac-
cording to a particular narrative. In the following sec-
tion, we propose the concept of a “bridging narrative”
to describe identity-imparting narrative structures be-
tween  groups  (social  bridging).  In  general,  groups
function as a catalyst for reformulating and spreading
radical  content within discourses,  strategically striv-
ing  to  achieve  cultural  hegemony  and  discursive
power  (see  Zick,  Küpper,  and  Krause  2016).  Ulti-
mately, the framing of certain terms and the associ-
ated narrative work can have a radicalizing effect on
the groups themselves (social bonding) as well as on
society as a whole (social linking).
2 Bridging narratives
The previous section presented an overview of the ex-
isting literature on meso-level sociological approaches
within radicalization research, which has been domi-
nated  by  formal approaches  to  identifying common
mechanisms across various radicalization phenomena.
In these approaches,  ideological  elements appear,  in
particular,  within  the  framework  of  intragroup pro-
cesses  of  socialization  and  homogenization.  What
cannot  be  explained by  these  approaches,  however,
are the ideological discursive elements (ideologemes)
and  narratives  that  are  shared  by  diverse  groups.
While these narratives are customized to the respec-
tive  area  in  specific  ways,  they  remain  part  of  the
same narrative pool and fulfill similar functions, struc-
turing patterns of perception, attributions of belong-
ing and options for action while also serving as con-
veyor belts for processes of radicalization.
Moreover, we witness many cases of shifting mem-
berships (conversions) from one group to another over
time – and perhaps even shifts in ideology.  Indeed,
members of radical groups can adapt their ideological
framework to the new environment with little effort,
especially when the principle ideological elements are
5 McAdam and Rucht (1993) investigated diffuusion processes
of ideas in social movements, especially within cross-na-
tional left  movements. In this study, we analyze diffuusion 
processes between ideologically diffuerent groups. 
shared between the old and new group. This is not so
much an indication of ideological arbitrariness of rad-
icalization processes but rather an indication that the
radicalizing potential of certain discourses and narra-
tives deserve further investigation. Furthermore, this
is also not to imply that we are dealing with different
manifestations of the same phenomenon (such as a
general  form  of  extremism)  or  that  all  phenomena
should be treated identically; the narratives are selec-
tively  applied  for  the  respective  area,  specifically
coded and assimilated.
In a broader sense,  past investigations have refer-
enced a “third position” with regard to the strategic
and partial amalgamation of right and left-wing cur-
rents and the commonalities of their content.6 These
entail alliances with anti-emancipatory overlaps that
cut across issue areas such as anti-semitism, homo-
phobia, transphobia, Islamophobia and anti-feminism
(Culina  and  Fedders  2016).  Yet,  at  the  same  time,
these  are  often  intentionally  formed  strategic  al-
liances.  Through the  concept  of  bridging narratives,
we seek to emphasize that ideological connections are
not necessarily created deliberately.
In  the  following  section,  we introduce two collec-
tions of closely interconnected narratives: first,  anti-
feminism  along  with  gender  constructions  such  as
masculism, heroic and toxic masculinity and feminin-
ity as a reproductive function; and, second, the dis-
positif of resistance, which expresses itself in vigilante
terrorism.7
6 Historically, the Third Way was developed as a self-de-
scription by various fascist groups between the two world 
wars, claiming a third position beyond capitalism und 
Marxist socialism. It was later revived in the second half of 
the twentieth century, e.g. as Troisème voie in France until 
2013 (Leclercq 2012), Terza Posizione in Italy (Caldiron 2013) 
that is now succeeded by Forza Nuova and CasaPound, a fas-
cist activism network with ties to the Identitarian Move-
ment in France, Austria and Germany, and the National 
Front, a fascist political Party in the UK (Busher 2018).
7 Elsewhere (Meiering et al. 2018; Meiering, Dziri, and 
Foroutan 2019), we included anti-Semitism as a junction at 
which anti-imperialism, anti-modernism and anti-universal-
ism converge. For this article, we opted for anti-feminism 
and the resistance dispositif as there is less literature about 
these narratives within radicalization research.
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2.1 Anti-feminism and constructions of masculinity
and femininity
The 2017 UNESCO Report about Youth and Violent
Extremism emphasized that “[t]here is an absence of
research into the construction of masculinity in rela-
tions to ideas of feminity [sic], when it comes to gen-
der,  social  media  and  radicalization”  (Alava,  Frau-
Meigs, and Hassan 2017, 44). One of our intentions is
to help fill this void, particularly considering that anti-
feminism  serves  as  a  key  contextual  bridge  that
stretches across various groups. Though this position
takes on different expressions among different radical-
ized  areas,  they  all  share  an  operating  principle  of
producing coherence inwardly  and connections  out-
wardly.
2.1.1 Anti-feminism in the New Right
Investigating anti-feminism among right-wing group-
ings  in  Germany,  Andreas  Kemper  argues  that  the
classic anti-feminism of the 1960s has undergone fun-
damental changes. Men are no longer assumed to be
(natural  and  therefore  legitimate)  perpetrators  but
have, inversely, been declared as victims of “state fem-
inism”, a line of reasoning that Kemper designates as
“masculism”  (2012).  By  extension,  whenever  (“origi-
nally  German”)  families are construed as victims of
this  development,  one  can  speak  of  “familialism”
(Kemper 2014, 61): familialists refer to a very limited,
population-biological,  national  and normative image
of  the  family  that  seeks  to  marginalize  or  combat
families that do not correspond to this model, such as
single-parents,  non-Germans,  financially  disadvan-
taged households and so-called patchwork or rainbow
families. Within the New Right, three currents propa-
gate the idea of familialism for different reasons. First,
the neo-liberal  current  rests on the conception of  a
middle-class  family  that  includes  a  single-earner
model. It seeks to destroy the welfare state or radi-
cally  limit  it,  and the family  is  supposed to absorb
whatever the socio-political consequences of this may
be. The second current consists of evangelical and ul-
tra-Catholic Christian fundamentalists. The third area
is  the  völkisch (racial-nationalist)  current  that  fears
the gradual “elimination” of the alleged “original” or
“indigenous”  white  Christian  European  population
through migration (in part based on the assumption
of the “great replacement” conspiracy). Instead, fami-
lies of “pure” origin are called upon to have as many
children  as  possible  in  order  to  hinder  this  demo-
graphic development. Consequently, this branch also
rejects homosexuality.
What these familialist currents have in common is
that  they turn sexuality  into the  core element  that
connects the middle-class family to the nation state.
In Foucauldian terms, one can say that the anti-femi-
nism of the right is used as a bio-political instrument
in order to regulate the populace in accordance with a
biological-national or racial conception of the family.
In this sense, anti-feminism serves as a point of inter-
section between racism, apocalyptic conspiracy theo-
ries and the opposition narrative.
Despite the presence of racist views – often linked
with anti-feminism – different religious groups seek
to establish close alliances, such as Catholic and Is-
lamist groupings or evangelical pro-lifers and ortho-
dox Jewish activists in the United States. For example,
the Forum of German Catholics declared Islam to be a
“natural  ally”  in  the  fight  against  the  “culture  of
death” (Kemper 2014, 23). How can these disparate al-
liances  of  Christian  and Islamic  fundamentalists  be
explained?
2.1.2 Femininity within Islamist Fundamentalism
The Islamist ideal of establishing an Islamic State is
based on concepts  of  social  and political  conditions
that existed on the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh
century, presented as the “ideal society governed by
Allah’s law” (Mahood and Rane 2017, 27, see Brown
2018). One key part of this state utopia rests on the
Salafist ideology of gender, which is depicted as the
alternative to the West and its idea of the equality of
men and women. Overall, social life abides by a dia-
metrical gender construction of men and women that
deems that to be completely opposed characters.  In
accordance  with  ethnic  conceptions  of  a  “national
community”, gender narratives form the heart of the
religiously defined community in this context (Cook
2017,  156ff.).  They assume an important role for re-
cruiting potential supporters in that the glorification
of the masculine and feminine gender roles they pro-
mote have a high degree of appeal for young people.
In particular, gender narratives demonstrate just how
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sexuality can be practiced in harmony with religious
precepts, especially when expectations of the family
or conservative-religious groupings are set in contrast
to  the  “majority  society”  (see  Saltman  and  Smith
2015).
Along with Salafist preachers and authors, glorifica-
tions of  the Islamist  gender order in the media are
also influential. Moreover, word-for-word adaptations
of  verses  from the  Quran  and popular  hadiths  (in-
structive  narratives  about  the  life  and  beliefs  of
Muhammad) play a decisive role, as well. Additionally,
writings by ISIS followers targeting broad audiences
are utilized, e.g. “Women in the Shade of Islam” (Al-
Sheha  2000)  and “Women of  the  Islamic  State”  re-
leased  by  the  Al  Khanssaa  Brigade  (Mohagheghi
2015),  a group which has been characterized as the
“female moral police of ISIS” (Gilsinan 2014). Making
use of  a  rhetorical  inversion,  these texts argue that
the “Western” discourse of emancipation actually op-
presses women by forcing them into activities that are
opposed to their very nature, such as professional oc-
cupations.  Islam,  on the other hand,  is  said to free
women by liberating them to pursue the reproductive
tasks  that  God  intended  (see  Shapiro  and  Maras
2018).
Accordingly,  the  primary  role  of  female  jihadi
Salafists is to bear sons. Motherhood is conventional-
ized  as  a  religious  effort  while  wives  are  largely
treated as the object of disciplining and control. The
high value placed on motherhood is a significant mo-
tivation among German converts as well as Muslims.
Since 2016, when ISIS losses were accumulating, the
female gender role started to adapt and promote the
idea of  the fighting woman,  “Mujahidah”.8 Up until
2016, ISIS never made use of female suicide bombers,
which would later change in response to calls to carry
out attacks in Western countries, including the knife
attack  perpetrated  by  a  15-year-old  female  student
from Hanover in January 2016 and the foiled attack
that was to be executed by various women in Paris in
September 2016. One important exception was the fe-
male Sharia police officers of the Khanssaa brigades
in the “caliphate” of Abu Bakr al Bagdhadi. Their task
was to enforce Islamic morals among the public and
8 See the East African jihadi magazine for women “al 
Ghurabaa”: httpps://jihadology.net/?s=al-Ghurab
%C4%81%E2%80%99+Magazine.
execute rigorous controls, including even the torture
of deviant women. The Khanssaa brigades were dis-
proportionately comprised of foreign female jihadists,
indicating  that  European  women  who  migrated  to
Syria also sought to live out their fantasies of violence
and adventure (Günther et al.  2016,  181).  Therefore,
even if we know that single life is not possible in ISIS
and single women are soon made to marry, Islamist
women cannot only be reduced to their instrumental
function as wives and mothers as they themselves are
ideologically convinced of their actions (Herschinger
2017).
Commonalities between Ethnic Nationalist  and Is-
lamist gender ideologies are not only present in the
way femininity is constructed; the gender narratives
promoted by the New Right and Salafist Islamism also
share heroic masculine world views. Generally speak-
ing, cults of masculinity are “a stable bridge linking all
authoritarian currents” (Weiß 2017, 237).
2.1.3 Heroic masculine world views as a common 
narrative for the New Right and Islamism
One remarkable example of an image of masculinity
adopted by the New Right is depicted in Jack Dono-
van’s book “The Way of Men”, which invokes a bar-
barian alliance of men. Though he is an avowed ho-
mosexual, Donovan does not call himself “gay” as this
term was forwarded by the liberal, urban and “femi-
nist-friendly” community (Donovan 2006). Instead, he
refers to himself as an “androphile”. According to this
conception,  homosexuality  is  only  acceptable  if  bal-
anced by  an  absurdly  augmented hypermasculinity.
This  heroic  model  of  masculinity  glorifies  pure  in-
stincts and violence as male virtues, falling back into a
form of barbarism considered to be “natural”. As these
role structures foster violent behavior and misogyny,
they can fuel radicalization processes among already
constituted groups that see themselves in a marginal-
ized position (Lehnert 2010) – such as the 2014 Isla
Vista Killings or the 2018 van Attack in Toronto, both
carried out by self-claimed “members” of the so-called
“Incel”  online  community  (Involuntary  Celibates).
Even  though masculists  like  Donovan  explicitly  de-
spise  Incels  and  the  Men’s  Rights  Movement  for
“whining”  about their  subordination to  women and
therefore  adopting  a  weak  masculinity,  Incels  vio-
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lently “restore” masculist patriarchy in killings or at-
tacks. As part of the “Incel Rebellion”, they seek re-
venge  for  being  oppressed  or  ignored  by  women.
Large parts of the community share white suprema-
cist, racist or alt-right views.
The  cult  of  masculinity  constitutes  an  important
commonality across different processes of radicaliza-
tion.  “The  terrorism  of  September  11th,  Donovan’s
masculism [...] come together in the heroic gesture of
the warrior who scorns civilization” (Weiß 2017, 237).
The actions of male jihadists are seldom considered
from a gender perspective (e.g. in Hegghammer (ed.)
2017;  Aslam  2012;  Brown  2018;  Shapiro  and  Maras
2018).  In  an analysis  of  the presentation of  jihadist
masculinity in the media, Günther et al. (2016) high-
light the violent warrior as one of three primary cate-
gories of male gender (next to the potential lover that
addresses  young  women  and  the  dutiful  individual
that promotes religious and moral legitimation). The
violent warrior is depicted as an invincible, merciless
agent acting in the service of the Islamic State. Fero-
cious presentations of this warrior are meant to scare
off the enemy (Kuffar), e.g. by depicting brutal scenes
of executions on YouTube. In 2015, adolescents were
presented in the role as executioners for the very first
time and celebrated  as  “Lions  of  tomorrow” by the
ISIS magazine “Dabiq” (2015, 20–21). Here, masculin-
ity is constructed as unrestrained power in an archaic
battle that often presents stereotypes of masculinity
borrowed from action films and computer games (see
also Bouzar 2014).
More generally, when considering the society of the
Islamic  State,  sexuality  norms  also  assume  a  core
function for exercising political  dominance.  Drawing
on Foucault, one can speak of a sexuality dispositif –
or a politics of the body – in re-traditionalized Islamic
societies.  Weiß notes that the Western middle class
has  also  regulated  sexuality  to  an  immense  degree
(Weiß 2017, 252; see Foucault 1978). As this sexuality
dispositif likewise exists within Judaism and Catholi-
cism, we are likely dealing with a specific, orthodox
dispositif and not merely a strictly Islamic one. As all
other  religiously  based  systems  of  domination,  Is-
lamism “has been modern in recognizing that sexual-
ity, as the key into the private sphere, allows for the
establishment of complete dominance over all of soci-
ety” (Weiß 2017, 250). In order to attain total access to
all areas of life, ISIS seeks to impose strict discipline
on women. This process is also fortified through a rev-
olutionary  dynamic  in  that  Islamist  movements  as-
sume an oppositional stance vis-à-vis the nation state
and formerly predominant Kemalist or Baathist secu-
larism – and certainly vis-à-vis the “immoral” West, as
well (see Hegghammer 2009).
All  in  all,  gender  narratives  assume a  domination
function in ethnic nationalism as well as in Islamism.
Constructions  of  masculinity  and  femininity  essen-
tially serve to stabilize a community that is defined
along ethnic or fundamentalist lines. Numerous stud-
ies have taken a differentiated approach to this issue,
though  most  only  address  far-right  groupings  and
phenomena that occurred in the 1990s (Fangen 1997
and 2003; Bitzan 2017; Lehnert and Radvan 2016). Ad-
ditional studies are needed to pick up from where pre-
vious attempts left off.
2.2 Resistance dispositif – vigilante radicalization
Another bridging narrative is that of “resistance”. We
have also chosen to speak of a dispositif here in order
to demonstrate that this is not specifically a matter of
(systematic)  ideology  but  instead  constitutes  a
plethora of connected narratives, activities and struc-
tures.9 Resistance enjoys  legal  protection within the
German constitution. Article 20, section 4 of the Basic
Law states that: “All Germans shall have the right to
resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional
order if  no other remedy is available.” Some protest
groups refer to the right of resistance in this sense in
order to legitimize their own actions (Kleger 2013). In
other cases, resistance is also invoked without a posi-
tive reference to the constitution.
As highlighted earlier, groups often tend to develop
strong internal coherence and an affinity for violence
when they code their group culture as a countercul-
ture, when they experience injustice, or when they are
engaged in a struggle against state actors (or  other
groups). Acting as a web that spins connections be-
tween these elements,  the dispositif  of  resistance is
capable  of  bundling  together  such  types  of  experi-
9 A dispositif comprises linguistic and non-linguistic arte-
facts that are connected to one another. They therefore in-
clude discourses and concepts as well as works of architec-
ture, laws, rules and behavior. See Meiering 2018.
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ences, meaning that various groups can claim to be
acting in the name of resistance. Whether acting out
against  the  decadent  West  that  is  destroying  one’s
identity or against non-believers,  imperialism, “capi-
tal” or the great “ethnic replacement” caused by im-
migration, whoever finds themselves in a position of
resistance must seize upon violent means once all oth-
ers have been exhausted – for something greater is
thought to be at stake.
Talk  of  resistance  has  gained  currency  in  recent
years, not least through right-wing populism and the
New Right. One of the most prominent conceptions is
that of a “great replacement”, referring to claims that
immigration  from non-European  countries  is  insidi-
ously  leading to Europeans being  “replaced”.  Words
such as “reconquista” open up a military as well as
historical framework that inserts contemporary politi-
cal events within a broader historical context (the ex-
pansion of Christian Kingdoms on the Iberian Penin-
sula between 711-1492),  evoking apocalyptic dooms-
day scenarios and creating an acute impulse to take
militant action. Germany, for example, witnessed an
explosive increase in racist and politically motivated
attacks,  often framed as reactions to refugee migra-
tion in 2015-2016. The Federal Ministry of the Interior
recorded  more  than  2,200  attacks  on  refugees  and
their places of residence in 2017 alone,10 with investi-
gators having only been able to successfully close the
case on a handful of the attacks. Strikingly, the por-
trait of the perpetrators who have been apprehended
hardly  corresponds  to  those  of  classic  far-right  ex-
tremists of the 1990s. These are neither young people
nor  strictly  economically  disadvantaged  individuals:
they stem from the so-called bourgeois middle class
and, in most cases, the attacks are not organized. Due
to their  lack of  organization,  such attacks are often
considered as isolated incidents and, as such, they are
not included in statistics of politically motivated vio-
lence. Since many incidents are single-perpetrator at-
tacks,  until  recently,  literature  has  treated  them as
lone-wolf terrorism. But with the rise in far-right ter-
rorism, there is a growing awareness of the limitations
of this  paradigm and a need for a re-orientation of
radicalization theory (Taylor 2019).  Blackbourn,  Mc-
10 FAZ online httpp://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft /krimi-
nalitaet/rassismus-mehr-als-2200-angriffue-auf-fluechtlinge-
im-2017–154 714220.html (accessed 23 July 2018).
Garrity, and Roach recently stated that the orthodoxy
that defined terrorism “as political violence by a mi-
nority community against the State” (2019, 184, refer-
ring to Wilkinson 2011) no longer holds true.
While much of the existing literature differentiates
between terror from above – state-sponsored terror in
a  totalitarian  regime  –  and  terrorism  from  below
(such as that committed by the RAF), these incidents
operate  at  a  different  level.  Such  manifestations  of
terrorist violence are neither directed at the state nor
are they perpetrated by the state. They do not target
the population as a whole but are rather aimed at a
specific  part  of  the population:  against  members  of
marginalized  groups,  such  as  refugees  or  Germans
with foreign ancestry, as well as against allies who ac-
tively provide assistance to or support refugees. In the
context of a comprehensive analysis of the NSU (Na-
tional  Socialist  Underground)  in  Germany,  Quent
(2016a; 2016b) proposes conceptualizing this form of
terrorist violence as vigilantism.
This concept refers to representative acts of violence
committed in the place of the state, as a better state or
beyond  the  state (Abrahams  1998;  Johnston  1996;
Schmidt-Lux 2013). In the United States, it is used to
describe certain forms of political violence in the Re-
construction era, especially lynching. Many case stud-
ies from the United States allow for generalizations
and hypotheses to be drawn for comparative research
on  vigilantism  (Abrahams  2007;  Berg  and  Wendt
2011). When vigilantism acts in the place of the state,
it aims to make up for deficient governmental struc-
tures, such as those found in failed states. In acting
beyond the state, vigilantism establishes parallel and
special structures alongside existing ones, such as in
the case of the Islamic State, to some degree. When
vigilante terrorism aims at the removal of a corrupted
government that is unable or unwilling to act, we re-
fer to cases of the “better state”. This variant accounts
for the rapid increase in the number of attacks against
refugee  accommodations,  militia  groups  such  as
Gruppe Freital, the racist Ku Klux Klan in the United
States and right-wing terrorist groups such as NSU,
which are connected with the idea of “leaderless resis-
tance”  (Kaplan  1997;  Dobratz  and  Waldner  2012;
Quent 2016b).
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While the “extremism of  the center” is  also refer-
enced when addressing such phenomena, as extrem-
ism theory starts from the basis of sidelined individu-
als – those with deviant views and those who oppose
the state – this idea is unable to analytically resolve
the issue at  hand.  According to Quent,  the  specific
character of vigilante terrorism lies in the act of self-
justice to uphold the system, or: “breaking the law in
order to respect it” (Abrahams 1998, 153, see also Cul-
berson 1990, 8). These actors do not aim to institute
any sort of fundamental revolution of the system but
instead believe that they are merely “defending” the
existing or the old order – even if the state’s power
monopoly must temporarily be suspended in order to
do so (see Abrahams 1998, 9 and 2007, 423 with the
notion  of  cultural  and  structural  “frontier  zones”
rather  than  geographic  divisions).  Vigilantism is  an
authoritarian movement or, rather, a conformist rebel-
lion:  its  protagonists  act  in  the name of  something
greater than themselves, appealing to a superordinate
power – the state or its people – that has momentar-
ily failed (see Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1976 on “es-
tablishment violence”). On the other hand, the objec-
tive is also to invoke fear among outsiders that are de-
fined as  being non-conformist,  as  not  belonging,  as
damaging or of lower value. Concurrently, part of the
strategy involves using political violence to force the
state to strengthen the security apparatus at the ex-
penses of freedom and equality and to enact restric-
tive laws in line with the views of the vigilantes (such
as the so-called Asylum Compromise from the 1990s
in Germany).  Essentially,  for them, no contradiction
exists  between the  formal  acceptance  of  democracy
and racist violence.
There  are  three  (ideal-type)  levels  of  vigilantism:
first-order vigilantism is directly oriented towards mi-
nority groups (e.g., the NSU’s murdering of ten people
of foreign ancestry); second-order vigilantism targets
political  enemies  (such  as  party  offices  or  refugee
helpers); and third-order vigilantism attacks the state
and  its  representatives  (including  the  assassination
attempt on the Mayor of Cologne, Henriette Reker, or
the assassination of  Kassel  district  president Walter
Lübcke).
In Germany, in the aftermath of the high influx of
refugees in 2015 and 2016, vigilante groups organized
city or village patrols in place of the government or to
oppose the government’s refugees policies – which, in
their view, was no longer able to enforce law and or-
der (Korsch 2017). One example is the group “Bürger-
wehr Freital/360” from the German state of Saxony,
whose members received prison sentences for found-
ing and abetting a terrorist organization. Established
by a bus driver from the town of Freital,  the group
carried  out  bombings  and  attacks  against  refugees
and  activists  in  2015  while  seeking  to  gain  public
prominence on social networks. The perpetrators jus-
tified  their  actions  in  the  name of  protecting  their
heimat. According to Quent, this group is illustrative
of  “a  great  number  of  largely  unknown individuals
and groups that make use of or endorse violence all
across the country in the name of defending or pre-
serving ‘the people’  as well  as  standing opposed to
change” (Quent 2016b).
The so-called Sharia Police – conceived by Sven Lau
in  Wuppertal,  Germany,  in  September  2014  –  is  a
slightly different case of vigilantism. Donning safety
vests,  this  group  addressed  individuals  in  front  of
gambling  halls  and  other  entertainment  establish-
ments  to  warn  them  about  the  officially  endorsed
crime of gambling, alcoholism, pornography, etc., and
to establish a Sharia Control Zone. Studies are yet to
investigate how much trust Salafist  powers place in
the technical capabilities of the state and the extent
to which they cast doubt on its moral legitimacy.
The vigilante narrative serves as a source of strate-
gic  self-justification  for  the  use  of  violence.
Kowalewski  (2002,  433)  considers  vigilantism  to  be
“among the most violent social groupings that exist”.
The extent to which this narrative plays a role in the
area of leftist militancy or Salafist jihadism is yet to
be  investigated.  In  terms  of  ISIS,  we  can  certainly
claim that the narrative is presented as the savior and
cleanser  of  a  degenerated  state  order  (resistance
against the hegemonic West or against the Crusaders
or Zionists and in preparation for the arrival of ad-
Dajjal  –  similar  to  the  eschatological  figure  of  the
Anti-Christ). In this case, we are dealing with a varia-
tion of vigilantism. Either way, the resistance disposi-
tif and its form of vigilantism is a bridging narrative
for processes of radicalization that should not be un-
derestimated.
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3 Conclusions
Research on group radicalization has shown that pro-
cesses of radicalization are more forcefully driven by
mechanisms of interaction than they are by specific
ideological  orientations:  among members  within the
group,  among different groups (relative co-radicaliza-
tion) and in  struggles with state actors (co-radicaliza-
tion). Inwardly, this leads to processes of homogeniza-
tion and, outwardly, to processes of exclusion. At the
same time, however,  radicalizations are not only in-
tensified by way of exclusion or through conflict with
other actors: the bridging narratives described above
are  used across  various  groups to share  models  for
perceiving the world and narratives to foster identity;
they  promote  the  formation  of  situational  alliances
and new coalitions. Through this process, radical nar-
ratives that are hostile to certain populations and that
legitimate the use of violence are strengthened across
these groups and come to form a toxic discursive con-
text. One element that is both dangerous and novel
with regard to such bridging narratives is that radical
groups  are  increasingly  turning  to  pop-cultural  ele-
ments to have a greater impact on the overall social
discourse as well as the middle-class milieu. Despite
the continued existence of conventional exclusionary
narratives in the sense of sub- or countercultures, as
well as archaic presentations, groups that initially ap-
pear to be moderate are, in fact, paving the way for
the radicalization of society. The consequence of this
process of  normalization is  that it  induces a feeling
among group members that they are acting as a silent
majority,  ultimately  setting up an environment that
favors violent measures.
4 Recommendations for action
First,  radical  critiques must be taken seriously.  Pro-
moting a critical view of the system is a key compo-
nent for recruitment strategies and for the self-image
of radicalized groups. Radical critiques are not, how-
ever, problematic in themselves but are rather an ex-
pression of existing social contradictions: throughout
time,  fundamental  social  advancements  have  also
been borne out of radical critiques. Offers for partici-
pation of actual substance place the image of an unal-
terable status quo into doubt and allow individuals to
experience  self-efficacy.  In  contrast,  attempts  at  re-
pression lead to escalation spirals and co-radicaliza-
tion.
Orient approaches towards new target groups. Re-
search and preventative efforts should not neglect the
deep-seated changes occurring within right-wing rad-
icalization processes in favor of solely addressing Is-
lamism; rather, their approaches should be adjusted
to consider new target groups (age, educational level,
economic power) and forms (e.g., vigilantism).
Avoid stigmatization. Prevention efforts should not
specifically  target  individual  groups  of  persons  but
rather address inter-group bridging narratives such as
the heroic-masculine world view, anti-feminism, anti-
semitism, conspiracy theories, conceptions of the en-
emy and resistance in order to avoid stigmatizing spe-
cific groups and therefore speak to a broader target
group.
Take gender seriously. Gender roles, e.g.,  heroic or
toxic  constructions  of  masculinity,  represent  a  con-
stant  bridge  that  spans  across  various  radicalized
groups. Preventive efforts should therefore apply con-
cepts that reflect upon the issue of gender.
Do not treat prevention work as a separate sphere.
Prevention efforts should be integrated within regular
structures.  Findings  from  sector-funded  programs
such as  Demokratie Leben (“Live Democracy”) should
flow into the work performed by institutional agen-
cies within civil society and the government adminis-
tration.  To  this  end,  we  encourage  policymakers  to
draft laws that endorse wide-ranging political educa-
tion and the promotion of democracy.
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